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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

Should a distinction be made in the case of recovery by a drawee
of the amount of a forged check or bill, in the limited class of cases
where any recovery is allowed at all? In general, as above stated,
no recovery back is allowed to a drawee who has paid a forged bill
or check. In general, the drawee must at his peril ascertain the
genuineness of the drawer's signature before paying, and is estopped
to dispute the genuineness of that signature after payment. But, as
above stated, where the party receiving payment was not a holder in
due course, i. e., did not receive payment in good faith and without
suspicion of the forgery, or did not pay value for the instrument, the
drawee is allowed to recover back. In such cases is the law different from what it is with respect to recovery of payments made under
forged indorsements, and does it require diligence in the matter of
discovery of the forgery as a prerequisite to recovery? It must be
admitted that there are some dicta to the effect that there is a difference in the two classes of cases, and that diligence in discovery
of the forgery is required in the case of recovery on a forged check
or bill.11
The court cites the case of Union National Bank v. Farmers'
Nati'nal Bank12 in support of its views. In that case, however, it
seems to have been conceded that there was undue delay both in the
discovery of the forgery (of checks) and in giving notice. In any
event the Pennsylvania law, based largely on an early statute, permitting recovery back of money paid on forged checks or bills (as
well as in case of forged indorsements), appears to be exceptional,
and to follow English, as opposed to American, precedent in requiring diligence in discovering the forgery as well as in giving notice
of it.'3
It is submitted that the dicta in the instant case are unfortunate.
On principle, and, it is submitted, the greater weight of authority,
the right of a drawee to recover money paid by him on a forged
check should depend solely on the question whether or not the
party receiving the money received it in good faith, and paid value
for the paper-the care or want of care of that party in taking the
paper being immaterial. Nor should mere delay in discovering the
forgery defeat the right of recovering back money paid on a forged
check or under a forged indorsement.
LOUIS M. GREELEY.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-CONTRABAND
The literature of the
[United States]

LIQUOR IN AUTOMOBILE.-

Fourth Amendment, much augmented in recent years, is still further
enriched by the recent case of Carrollv. United States,' dealing with
the conditions under which an automobile in transit may be searched
11.

Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany (1841)

Harvey (1874) 75 Ill. 638.
12. (1921) 271 Pa. St 107.

1 Hill. 287; Schroeder v.

13. Iron City National B nk v. Fort Pitt National Bank (1893) 159 Pa.
St. 46; 7 C. .J.p. 690 note.
1. (1925) 45 S. Ct. Rep. 280.
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for contraband liquor by federal officers without a warrant. Certain
federal prohibition agents had reason to suspect from their contact
with defendants in September, 1921, that the latter were engaged in
illicit liquor traffic by automobile between Detroit and Grand
Rapids, Mich. About eleven weeks later they saw defendants driving in an automobile over the road between those places. The
officers stopped defendants, searched their car, and found sixtyeight bottles of whisky and gin concealed behind the upholstery of
the seats. Defendants were arrested and the liquor seized. At the
trial of the defendants for violation of the Volstead Act two of the
seized bottles were admitted in evidence against them over their
objection, after their unsuccessful motion that all of the seized
liquor be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. From a conviction in the federal court for the western district of Michigan defendants took a writ of error to the United
States Supreme Court, where the case was twice argued and finally
submitted in March, 1924.
The decision, rendered March 2, 1925, upheld the conviction.
It pointed out that "the Fourth Amendment does not denounce all
searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable,' 2 and that
an amendment to the national Prohibition Act, which made it a misdemeanor for any federal agent in enforcing the Act to search any
private dwelling without a warrant, or to search any other building
or property maliciously or without reasonable cause,3 was adopted
after a conference between committees of the House and Senate
which explicitly rejected a proposal that no property or premises
should be searched without a warrant, on the ground that this would
make it impossible to stop rum-running automobiles. The distinction between the necessity for a warrant to search buildings and to
search vehicles was declared consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
and borne out by revenue legislation of 1789, 1790, 1793, 1799, and
1815 (the latter authorizing informal searches of beasts and persons
as well as vehicles, and finally embodied in section 3061 of the
United States Revised Statutes). The court continued:
"We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to
show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since
the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, .dwelling house, or other structure in
respect of which a prope official warrant readily may be obtained, and
a search of a ship, motor-boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
"Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched
without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances
such search may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable if
a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
2. 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 283.
3. 42 St. L. 223 c. 134 sec. 6.
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chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because
of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as
effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within
the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing
that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise . . .
"If an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor in it without a
warrant, and the facts as subsequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture, the officer may escape costs or a
suit for damages by showing that he had reasonable or probable cause
for the seizure..
. . We here find the line of distinction between
legal and illegal seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It gives the owner of an automobile or
other vehicle seized under section 26, in absence of probable cause, a
right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the
Weeks and Amos cases 4 from the use of the liquor as evidence against
him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to damages. On
the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the government and
its officials are given the opportunity which they should have to make
the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband
goods and to seize them. Such a rule fulfills the guaranty of the
Fourth Amendment."5
It was also held that section 26, title 2, of the national Prohibition Act, which purports to authorize seizure when any officer shall
"discover" any person in the act of illegally transporting liquor in
any vehicle, did not confine the means of discovery to the senses of
the officer, but included information from any source; nor did it
limit the occasions of seizure to those where there would have been
a common-law right to arrest without a warrant; and that the prior
dealings the prohibition officers had had with the defendants gave
them reasonable cause to believe that they were illegally carrying
liquor when stopped in the present case.
Mr. Justice McReynolds gave a dissenting opinion (in which
Mr. Justice Sutherland concurred) on the ground that Congress
had not authorized an arrest without warrant upon only such suspicion as existed in this case; that the liquor offered in evidence
was obtained by a search in connection with such an illegal arrest
and so was inadmissible; and that the facts known to the officers
were not sufficient to create a reasonable belief that defendants were
illegally transporting liquor, and hence to authorize a seizure without a warrant.
"The negotiation concerning three cases of whiskey on September
29th was the only circumstance which could have subjected plaintiffs
in error to any reasonable suspicion. The arrest came two and a half
months after the negotiation. Every act in the meantime is consistent
4. Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383; Amos v. United States
(1921) 255 U. S. 313.
5. 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 285, 286.
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with complete innocence. Has it come about that merely because a
man once agreed to deliver whiskey, but did not, he may be arrested
whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an automobile on the road to
Detroit ?"

The decision and reasoning in the Carroll case represent a sensible iriterpretation of the Fourth Amendment, and should enable
federal prohibition officers to do their duty without undue risk and
hindrance. In view of the rather liberal scope given to the requirement of "reasonable or probable cause" by the court, it seems likely
that a common reputation in the community of being a 'bootlegger'
would justify prohibition agents in stopping and searching automobiles driven by persons thus suspected by their neighbors.
Some of the more recent state decisions, generally in accord
with the principal case, are given in the note below.7
JAMES PARKER HALL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEPARATION

OF POWERS--POWER OF

PRESIDENT TO PARDON CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.- [United States1
The federal district court case of United States v. Grossman, holding the President without power to pardon a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a federal district judge for a criminal contempt
in disobeying a Volstead Act injunction against the illegal sale of
liquor, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Ex
2 In the comment 3 in this
parte Grossinan.
REvIEW on the case in
the district court, it was suggested that, whatever might be the rule
as regards contempts committed in the presence of the court and
actually interferirng with the process of adjudication, contempts
arising out of the administration of public law ought to be pardonable by the executive. The reasoning of the opinion of the court by
Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the Grossman case goes beyond this, and
would apparently hold all criminal contempts against the authority
of the federal courts pardonable by the President, regardless of
their nature. The opinion justifies this both upon grounds of history and policy. It was the English practice from an early period,
and has been followed in the federal practice of this country from
1841 to the present time, the diligence of the Attorney-General's
office disclosing at least twenty-seven cases of its exercise by the
President under the most diverse circumstances, supported by sev6. 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 292.
7. Holding search of automobile and seizure of liquor therein valid
without a warrant where officer had reasonable suspicion of illegality:
Patrick v. Comm. (Ky. 1923) 250 S. W. 507; People v. Chyc (1922) 219

Mich. 273; People v. De Cesare (1922) 220 Mich. 417; Houck v. State (Ohio

1922) 140 N. E. 112; Hughes v. State (1922) 145 Tenn. 540; Brown, v. State
(1922) 92. Tex. Cr. 147. In People v. Case (1922) 220 Mich. 379 a search
was upheld where no definite suspicion existed, but illegal liquor was actually
found. On the other hand searches and seizures based upon suspicion only
were held illegal in Butler v. State (1922) 129 Miss. 778; State v. Gibbons
(1922) 118 Wash. 171; and Hoyer v. State (Wis. 1923) 193 N. W. 89.
1. (N. D. Ill. E. Div. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 94f.
2. (1925) 45 S. Ct. Rep. 332.
3. (1924) I. L.- Rv. XIX 176.

